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Abstract 
 
The political mainstream in the Netherlands and Sweden has been challenged by a 
growing support for the populist radical right (PRR) and a public opinion that is 
increasingly dissatisfied with the pursued immigration/integration policies. 
Conventional narratives suggest that parties respond to these cues by making drastic 
shifts to their manifesto positions, either in a restrictive/assimilationist (RA) or 
liberal/multicultural (LM) direction, as a way of pre-empting any electoral losses or 
dismissing the niche position. While the Dutch parties have been more likely than 
their Swedish counterparts to make such changes, they have not always been 
connected to the above stimuli. The article argues instead that such positional 
volatility is amplified by the (in)stability of the societal fault lines, and the relative fit 
between these cleavages and parties’ choice of issue framing (economic or socio-
cultural). While providing some support for supply-and-demand explanations, the 
article’s focus on dimensional stability and issue fit calls attention to the variability in 
conflict mobilisation and the role of mainstream parties as active agents in shaping 
debates on immigration and integration.  
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Introduction 
 
The Netherlands and Sweden are often grouped together in the political science and 
migration literature. On the one hand, due to institutional similarities (Richardson, 
1982) and on the other, due to similar approaches to immigration and integration 
(Geddes, 2003). Their corporatist arrangements successfully de-politicised the 
immigration ‘issue’ for a remarkably long period of time whereas their ‘multicultural’ 
orientations constructed national narratives that accepted as well as promoted ethnic 
difference (Soininen, 1999; Bruquetas-Callejo et al, 2007).  
However, by the early 1990s several societal changes were underway which 
subsequently moved the issue away from the consultation committees and into the 
party-political arena. The institutional structures were reformed (Lindvall and 
Sebring, 2005; Jones, 1999), and both cases witnessed a dramatic rise in ‘numbers’ 
(Bevelander, 2004; Vink and Meijerink, 2003) and an increasingly split public 
opinion (Dahlström and Esaiasson, 2011; Breugelmans and van de Viejer, 2004). 
This, in turn, provided fertile ground for the emergence and formation of populist 
radical right parties (PRR) (Mudde, 2007).  
 Although saliency levels have fluctuated, the overall pattern suggests that 
immigration/integration have become increasingly more important for parties and 
electorates alike (Rydgren, 2002; Vliegenhart and Roggeband, 2007). But merely 
emphasising an issue may not always be enough, especially if the adopted stance is 
associated with electoral shortcomings (Adams et al 2004). The literature thus 
suggests two potential party responses. They can drastically change their manifesto 
positions to signal a clear commitment to restrictive immigration/assimilationist 
integration policies. This, the argument runs, will be an attempt to co-opt/outperform 
the PRR and/or to clearly respond to these public mood changes. Conversely, parties  
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can make equally drastic changes but in the opposite direction, thereby emphasising a 
liberal immigration/multicultural integration stance (hereafter labelled RA and LM). 
This more proactive behaviour aims to dismiss the niche position and clearly place the 
party on the side of, e.g., human rights and ethnic diversity (Meguid 2005).  
While accepting these premises, we also suggest that the opportunities for 
making such changes are likely to depend on the external environment that parties 
function in. The prevailing institutions can be more or less stable and provide 
different incentives for the degree of change undertaken. In particular, we focus on 
the (in)stability of social cleavages in multi-dimensional vs. uni-dimensional party 
systems. The former should allow for more flexibility regarding issue framing (e.g. is 
the impact predominantly economic or socio-cultural?). In the latter, however, parties 
are more likely to experience a cleavage ‘lock-in’ that further narrows down the space 
for (re)interpreting immigration’s effects. The electoral gains from making drastic 
changes – and thereby deviating from the overall position - should thus be reduced. 
But such shifts must also make electoral sense. This relates to the twin concerns of 
whether they are likely to correspond better to voters’ spatial placement, and whether 
the immigration ‘issue’ is considered salient enough to warrant any additional 
attention (which a drastic change undoubtedly signals). Yet making such changes may 
not necessarily lead to an increased vote share or help to stem off the outflow of 
votes. Parties may very well miscalculate and move too much, thereby subjecting 
themselves to sustained criticism for being either too ‘liberal’ or too ‘restrictive’.  
As both cases experienced similar supply-and-demand-type pressures (PRR 
success and public mood volatility), we expect these to also have filtered through to 
the party manifestos by positions having changed drastically. But as we demonstrate, 
the Dutch manifestos show a higher frequency of such changes than the Swedish ones 
do (see also van Spanje, 2010; Brandorf et al, 1995). This variance is thus surprising 
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and presents a comparative puzzle. As per a ‘most similar systems design’ 
(Meckstroth, 1975), we seek to explain two interlinked phenomena: (1) what is the 
rationale for making drastic changes in the first place, and (2) what explains the 
greater likelihood of such changes in the Dutch - but not the Swedish - case? 
 
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
Manifesto positions often remain relatively fixed but may change due to particular 
external circumstances, e.g. significant electoral losses or shifts in public opinion 
(Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009). Contrary to studies that address incremental 
directional shifts or party responses to a more volatile electorate, the reasons for any 
drastic changes tend to receive scant scholarly attention (although cf. Adams and 
Merrill, 1999). This lack of attention is surprising given how such behaviour may 
affect the strength of the ‘party image’ (Rohrschneider, 1993) or imply limping from 
one strategy to the next (Scheffer, 2011). Since drastic changes could also prompt an 
association with some form of leadership shortcoming (van Wessel, 2010), 
establishing when and why parties would make these moves is important for 
understanding the implications they have on the party-electorate linkages and for 
voters’ perceptions of an increasing democratic deficit (Norris, 2011). Focusing on 
manifesto changes, and competition over the immigration ‘issue’, provides general 
conclusions about the evolving nature of party competition but also some more 
specific insights into how parties engage with an issue that rarely has an obvious 
dimensional fit.  
Previous studies tend to start with either a supply or a demand perspective. In 
the former, the presence/success of the PRR is said to generate a co-opting response 
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(Minkenberg, 2001) and mainstream parties will strive to crowd out these challengers 
by taking over their positions. Accordingly, any changes will be restrictive (regarding 
immigration control) and assimilationist (regarding integration policies) in response 
to this electoral ‘threat’ (van Spanje, 2010).  
On the demand side, conversely, the public mood can become more RA and 
prompt similar changes (Sadiraj et al, 2010). But merely moving in tandem with 
public opinion may not always be enough. Parties will also need to show a clear 
commitment to the issue – by perhaps being more ‘intense’ (Rabinowitz and 
MacDonald, 1989) - in order to (re)capture any lost votes. This is said to explain the 
emergence of discourses that promise to be ‘tough on immigration’, thus resulting in 
manifesto positions that drastically shift in order to clearly signal this stance. 
However, responses can also be more proactive and the manifesto statements will thus 
counter with a dismissive position that aims to discredit the niche party stance 
(Meguid 2005). Changes will still be drastic but in the opposite direction when 
attempting to set the agenda and/or to change the public mindset. Such behaviour 
further emphasises the agency that party elites can exercise when trying to position 
their party at the leading cusp or ahead of public opinion (Cox and McCubbins, 2005).   
A limitation facing these narratives is that they do not account for any drastic 
shifts that occur even when the PRR is not a significant electoral threat (Bruff, 2003). 
By the same token, they also face difficulties explaining moderate, or non-existent, 
changes even though a PRR threat is imminent (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008) 
and/or public opinion becomes more RA (Dahlström and Esaiasson, 2011).    
Furthermore, neither narrative addresses the effects that social cleavages can 
have on any (re)positioning. If one accepts the multi-dimensionality of the political 
space (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995), then questions of immigration/integration will 
be difficult to pin down to any particular dimension since they often have both 
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economic and socio-cultural effects (Lahav and Courtenmanche, 2011). Parties will 
therefore have to negotiate, and decide on, what type of issue the immigration ‘issue’ 
constitutes. As such, the main question is not whether it gives rise to a ‘new’ cleavage 
(or not), or whether it can be fully absorbed into existing ones (or not). Instead, the 
more pertinent query relates to how flexible the institutional space is for parties to 
frame – as well as reframe – the societal effects of immigration, and whether these 
interpretations fit with the dominant cleavage. This relative degree of issue 
compatibility can thus facilitate, or constrain, parties’ scope for making any drastic 
changes.  
For parties that function in systems characterised by multiple and unstable 
cleavages, more opportunities for (re)framing should be available compared to what 
uni-dimensional and stable ones can offer. Multi-dimensionality is thus likely to 
generate a greater degree of electoral choice but also a greater degree of uncertainty. 
Intra-party negotiations may therefore undergo a series of positional shifts as they 
work out how to win the new electoral calculus and/or how to resolve any internal 
divisions deriving from the new issue. In systems characterised by one but stable 
cleavage, parties are more likely to experience a cleavage ‘lock-in’. This limits the 
incentives as well as the opportunities, for making any drastic changes. While our 
discussion focuses on immigration/integration, the underlying mechanisms 
contributing to positional changes have implications for how parties contest ‘new’ 
issues – more broadly - in party systems characterised by single or multiple cleavages.  
Given this overview, we address how mainstream parties have engaged with 
the immigration ‘issue’ by setting out the following hypotheses:   
 
H1: When the PRR experiences greater electoral success, drastic manifesto 
changes are more likely; 
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H2: When public opinion favours more RA policies, drastic manifesto changes 
are more likely; 
 
H3: In party systems characterised by multiple and unstable cleavages, and 
where the perceived impact of immigration does not ‘fit’ with the dominant 
fault line, drastic manifesto changes are more likely. 
 
The article proceeds as follows. We first operationalise ‘positions’; ‘drastic changes’ 
and ‘discussed impact’ and then conduct a three-fold manifesto analysis for each 
country (1991-2010). The timeframe includes several points where parties should 
have been subject to increased (re)framing pressures and we would therefore expect 
these strains to also be reflected in their respective manifestos. It is further bookended 
by two ‘critical junctures’: sudden issue politicisation and presence of anti-
immigration parties in both parliaments. The manifesto analysis as such is based on 
the positional scaling system developed by Pellikaan et al (2003; see also Odmalm, 
2012; De Lange, 2007). While the Comparative Manifesto Project and the Chapel Hill 
Expert Survey both include ‘positions on immigration’, they treat the term almost 
exclusively as a question of integration1. The study conducted here, however, captures 
stances on immigration and integration (‘positions’), and breaks down the substantive 
focus into two sub-categories (economic and socio-cultural) when these positions are 
articulated (‘discussed impact’). We then return to the article’s original hypothesis 
(H.3), compare it to the competing explanations found in the literature (Hs 1 and 2) 
and discuss our findings with respect to the broader implications they have for the 
study of party politics.   
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Data and Methods 
 
To establish positions, discussed impact and degree of change over the time, we 
consider the manifestos2 for all mainstream parties3 with a national level 
representation. Manifestos are a central data source since they ‘inform the electorate 
about the course of action the party will pursue when elected’ (Klingemann, 
1987:300) and are as such well suited for investigating political agendas and party 
conflict in comparative perspective (Green-Pedersen, 2007; Walgrave and 
Nuytemanns, 2009 but see also Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006).  
We further consider the immigration ‘issue’ to involve expressed positions on 
immigration as well as integration4. To capture these we have carried out a hand-
coded content analysis (Patton, 2002) using key words to identify the quasi-sentences 
associated with each individual category5. All indicators, except for ‘Immigration (in 
general)’; ‘Student migration’6 and ‘Integration’, were scored depending on whether 
statements suggested a more liberal (-1) or more restrictive (+1) approach to the 
prevailing policies. E.g. FP’s statement in 2010 (‘Sweden should be open to labour 
migrants’) was given a score of -1, whereas SP’s in 2002 was scored +1 (‘No short-
sighted imports of foreign labour’). For ‘Integration’ the following scores were used: 
(-1) if the statement was primarily in favour of a more inclusive and universalistic 
approach (e.g. ‘Immigrants experience particular difficulties with employment, these 
walls need to be removed’ (V, 2002)), and (+1) if that statement indicated a more 
exclusive and particularistic stance (‘VVD is for an end to the subsidised integration 
industry’ (2010)). When statements were unclear or ambiguous, a score of (0) was 
allocated, exemplified by CDA’s 2010 statement on ‘Labour migration’: ‘Admission 
of migrant workers should be based upon the needs of the Dutch labour market’, and 
by M’s 1998 statement on ‘Integration’: ‘Our integration policies aim to reduce 
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welfare dependency’. To ensure coding consistency, continuous inter-reliability 
checks were carried out. Statements were initially scored by one author and then 
passed on to the other to score ‘blind’. Some coding discrepancies were identified 
through this process, e.g. one author would allocate a score of (+1) whereas the other 
would give it a (0). These instances tended to arise when the concerned quasi-
sentences were particularly lengthy, thus prompting a discussion and occasional 
recoding of the score. All indicators were then added together to provide a positional 
range from -7 to +7 where the closer to -7 a party is, the more LM its stance is. 
Conversely, the closer to +7 a party is the more RA will its position be7.  
We then calculated how much these positions had changed and in which 
direction. This was done by simply looking at the differences between Y1 and Y2’s 
scores. These were then coded according to the following criteria: ‘No Change’ (0); 
‘Change’ (+1/-1) and ‘Drastic Change’ (> +2/-2). For a change to be classified as 
‘Drastic’, it had to constitute a move of two or more spatial points since this more 
obviously indicated that the party was breaking away from its ‘original’ position.  
Finally, we examined the perceived effects (‘discussed impact’) that the 
immigration ‘issue’ was considered to have. For some categories – namely ‘Labour’, 
‘Student Migration’, ‘Family Reunification’ and ‘Unaccompanied Minors’ – these 
fitted easily into either dimension (‘economic’ for the first two8; ‘socio-cultural’ for 
the latter9). However, statements relating to ‘Immigration (in general); 
‘Asylum/Refugees’ and ‘Integration’ often connected to both economic and socio-
cultural concerns and were subsequently broken down further and coded as 
‘Immigration (in general) (economic)’; ‘Immigration (in general) (socio-cultural)’; 
‘Asylum/Refugee (economic)’; ‘Asylum/Refugee (socio-cultural)’, ‘Integration 
(economic)’, and ‘Integration (socio-cultural)’10. These additional categorisations 
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provide an ‘Impact Index’11 made up of five ‘Economic’ and five ‘Socio-cultural’ 
indicators that range from 0 (low) to 5 (high impact).   
 
 
Manifesto Positions and Changes over Time  
 
Tables 1. and 2. show the aggregate manifesto positions over time.  
 
(Tables 1 and 2 about here) 
 
Tables 3. and 4. show type and direction of changes per party. 
 
 (Tables 3 and 4. about here).   
 
Drastic changes occur more frequently in the Dutch than the Swedish manifestos 
(67% of the time compared to 20%). Between 1994-1998, the overall pattern suggests 
a drastic shift in the LM direction which is followed by an equally drastic swing but in 
the RA direction. From 2002-2006, there is evidence of polarisation and positions 
change drastically in both directions. This trend continues in 2006-2010 but the 
moves are either drastic, or incremental, in an RA direction versus moving 
incrementally in, or maintaining, the LM position.  
There are several inter-party differences however. Between 1994-1998, D’66 
and VVD do not make any drastic changes, whereas the others do, and between 1998-
2002, only SP and GL do not make such changes. From 2002-2006, PvdA does not 
follow the overall drastic trend, and in 2006-2010 the party system is split with three 
manifestos (SP’s; PvdA’s and D’66’s) not exhibiting any drastic changes. Post-2002, 
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polarisation not only increases but the manifestos also alternate between drastic LM 
and RA moves compared to the preceding election. During the 1991-2010 period, 
CDA; VVD, and GL have most frequently made drastic changes. 
The Swedish manifestos paint a different picture. Between 1991-1994 about 
half of the positions change in the RA direction, but none of these are drastic. In 
1994-1998 it only applies to V while there is no clear overall direction. Between 
1998-2002, positions predominantly move in the LM direction but SAP’s and FP’s 
are the only ones to make any drastic shifts. The 2002-2006 period stands out. Here, a 
directional polarisation develops but with the (perhaps) surprising grouping of MP; V; 
SAP and FP making RA changes while CP and M head in the opposite direction. 
However, only V and FP make any drastic changes. In 2006-2010, two manifestos 
(MP’s and KD’s) make drastic changes (LM), and the remaining ones move either 
incrementally or hold their position. In the Swedish case, V and FP exhibit the highest 
number of drastic changes.  
 
 
Explaining the Degree and Direction of Change  
 
Why have the Dutch manifestos been more likely to make such drastic changes?  We 
will first address the previous explanations set out in the literature: as being a 
response to successful PRR challengers (H.1) and/or to the restrictive swings in public 
opinion (H.2). We then discuss our original contribution – that such changes reflect 
the magnitude and stability of the societal cleavages, and the relative degree of issue 
‘fit’ with these divides (H.3).   
The PRR’s electoral success is often put forward to explain the positional 
changes made by mainstream parties. A reasonable explanation would thus be that the 
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Dutch parties have reacted to this cue by drastically changing their positions in order 
to win back any lost votes and/or to clearly signal their societal visions. In Sweden 
where this threat has been comparatively weaker, the need to make any similar 
changes is largely absent thereby explaining the relatively minor adjustments made 
(see further Hinnfors et al, 2011; Bale, 2003; 2008).  
While our data would indeed suggest that the Dutch parties either ‘co-opt’ or 
‘dismiss’ the niche position, the timing points to how the influence of the PRR may, at 
the very least, be exaggerated, and, at most, be detached from the drastic changes 
undertaken. For example, the shifts that take place in 1994-1998 and 1998-2002 
predate the success of either List Pim Fortuyn or the PVV. Equally, the expected 
responses in 2002-2006 and 2006-2010 are not evidenced uniformly since only the 
former cycle predominantly indicates drastic changes taking place (H.1).  
Furthermore, considering the changes that took place before and after the PRR 
experienced electoral success, H1 is not fully supported. From 1994-2002, the average 
change is 2.42 positions, and between 2002-2010 it decreases slightly to 2.3. In other 
words, drastic changes were made before and after the PRR was a significant electoral 
presence. The Swedish figures are still below the drastic threshold but positions were 
more likely to change after the PRR ceased to be an electoral threat at the 
parliamentary level (0.57 between 1991-1994 compared to 1.17 between 1994-
2010)12.  
 
(Tables 5 and 6 about here) 
 
Nor can such shifts be solely explained by the RA turns in public opinion since the 
manifestos that drastically change do not necessarily belong to those parties whose 
size in parliament declined in the subsequent elections (see further Adams et al, 
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2004). The public mood has grown increasingly restrictive, especially regarding 
asylum seekers (Todosijević et al, 2009), and if one looks at the overall changes 
between 1994-2010, the Dutch parties appear to be more responsive to these cues yet 
their drastic changes are not consistent. In comparison, the Swedish manifestos are 
remarkably static even in the presence of such stimuli that would otherwise predict 
drastic changes taking place (H.2).  
While it may be too early to reach any conclusive statements about the PRR’s 
influence in Sweden, especially following the 2010 breakthrough of the Sweden 
Democrats, it is clear that even the most recent (re)politicisation does not come close 
to the pre-PRR politicisation of the ‘issue’ in the Netherlands. As such, the PRR’s 
impact continues to explain the gradual shift of some parties to the right but cannot 
explain the overall positional volatility from one election cycle to the next (H.1). 
Similarly, shifts in public opinion only explain some drastic movements in some party 
manifestos in some years (H.2).   
 
 
The Interplay between Cleavage Stability, Issue Fit and the Rationale for 
Making Drastic Changes  
 
So far we have only found partial support for Hs 1 and 2. The article will now address 
H.3 - in party systems characterised by multiple and unstable cleavages, and where 
the perceived impact of immigration does not ‘fit’ with the dominant fault line, drastic 
manifesto changes are more likely..  
While immigration’s economic impact is identified to a similar degree in both 
countries, its socio-cultural implications stand markedly higher in the Netherlands 
(see Figure 1.) 
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(Figure 1 about here). 
 
In capturing these references, however, Figure 1. does not reflect the amount of space 
devoted to either dimension but rather the type of impact that is emphasised. The 
Swedish manifestos tend to consider economic and socio-cultural implications as 
roughly equal but the former begins to surpass the latter by 2002. This development is 
not only indicative of the cross-party consensus on immigration control and 
multiculturalism that prevailed (Dahlström, 2004) but also of the rift that emerged in 
the late-1990s. The main sources of contention concerned the appropriate loci for 
deciding on labour migration demand (individual firms vs. employment agencies), 
and how to best achieve economic integration (pursuing equality measures vs. freeing 
up the labour market regulations) (Spång, 2008). By framing the immigration ‘issue’ 
accordingly it did not disrupt the party-political equilibrium since these areas tapped 
into pre-existing conflicts regarding state-market relations. As such, the Swedish 
mainstream has continuously managed to circumvent the more perilous ‘welfare state 
chauvinism/value-conservative’-side of the immigration coin which is frequently 
championed by the PRR. This is not the case in the Netherlands, however. While 
some agreement exists on some aspects of the economic dimension (e.g. easing entry 
requirements for highly skilled migrants), the socio-cultural implications of 
immigration are increasingly emphasised and have also become increasingly polarised 
(van Spanje, 2010). This conflict has thus exacerbated party differences on questions 
of social cohesion and what the Netherlands is, and should be, as a nation.  
The relative ease with which the Swedish parties have managed to position 
themselves on either side of the debate was facilitated by their position on the 
dominant economic cleavage (Sundberg, 1999) being transferred, and applied, to their 
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positions on (labour) migration and modes of integration. Consequently, there have 
not been any obvious incentives to deviate too far from the position parties already 
hold, which would explain the relative lack of drastic changes that we identified. 
These differences in framing are important because of how they affect party 
competition and, subsequently, the rationale for making drastic changes. In the 
Netherlands, voters’ preferences - and party positions - are increasingly structured 
around a two-dimensional space but competition largely takes place along a single, 
left-right dimension (van der Brug and van Spanje, 2009). Given the correlation 
between economic-left and LM-leftist positions, and the economic-right and RA-
rightist positions, this can potentially leave voters whose preferences are in the 
economic-left and RA-right quadrant with no obvious mainstream option. A greater 
degree of volatility is likely to ensue depending on saliency levels of different issues 
in different years, and as voters choose between parties that represent some, but not 
all, of their preferences and between parties deemed competent on some, but not all, 
of those issues (Green and Hobolt, 2008; van der Brug, 2004).  
When ‘new’ issues become a source of conflict and when that conflict is not 
on the dominant (usually, economic) cleavage, parties face a new set of strategic 
choices regarding which voters to pursue. Without needing to change their economic 
position, they can compete by making a drastic issue positional move. This is 
particularly relevant when the preferred party does not provide the desired position on 
the new issue. At the same time, parties also have to contend with preference variation 
among their core voters, some of whom will want more a hard line approach, whereas 
others will not.  
Thus, new questions of strategy and positioning will arise. Should parties 
focus on keeping their ‘own’ voters, and can they do that without changing their 
position on the new issue (Sani and Sartori, 1983)? Or is a shift required to shore up 
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that vote? Much like party responses to the environmental ‘issue’ some thirty years 
prior (Rohrschneider, 1993), such positional volatility is the result of those strategic 
choices that must be addressed when an issue is understood as cross-cutting from 
parties’ stances on the dominant cleavage.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This contribution has examined how the Dutch and Swedish mainstream engaged 
with the immigration ‘issue’ during a period of increased politicisation. Of particular 
concern was to explain why drastic manifesto changes have been more likely in one 
case (the Netherlands) than the other (Sweden) even though one would expect such 
changes to be present in both. The comparison highlights the need to address 
particular institutional effects on the dynamics of party competition. Cleavage 
stability; the relative fit between these fault lines, and the degree to which parties are 
able to contest selected aspects of the immigration ‘issue’ are found to be likely 
explanatory factors for the observed behaviour. The findings are important since 
previous research often overlooks such relationships in favour of how parties respond 
to the PRR’s success and/or shifts in public opinion. These factors offer only a partial 
explanation for the outcomes in both cases.  
Yet drastic changes do not happen automatically but are rather likely to take 
place under two preconditions. First, the existing cleavages must be porous enough so 
as to allow the immigration ‘issue’ to be framed as either an ‘economic’ or ‘socio-
cultural’ matter. Second, these shifts must also be accompanied by a perceived and, in 
the long run, actual electoral advantage (either additional votes and/or a 
monopolisation of the question). From this perspective, the more ‘entrepreneurial’ a 
party is (Ström. 1990), the more likely it will also be to undertake these changes.  
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The Netherlands and Sweden are also unique in many ways. In the latter, due to the 
limited space that is available to address immigration/integration as a ‘socio-cultural’ 
matter, and in the former, due to the exceptionally high degree of positional volatility 
(Mair, 2008). However, when placing the analytical attention on the relative fit 
between issue framing and the pre-existing cleavages, we highlight a process likely to 
have broader applicability and one which merits further exploration. Indeed, our 
conclusions are in line with the developments found in the policy agendas and party 
competition literature (Green-Pedersen, 2007; Walgrave et al, 2006).   
While our findings support the idea of the two-dimensional space, they also 
question the ease with which some of these ‘new’ issues can be successfully 
‘integrated into this structure’ (Kriesi et al, 2006: 949; Hooghe et al, 2002). The 
Swedish parties appear to have been ‘better’ at incorporating immigration/integration 
into the existing cleavages, which, in contrast, their Dutch equivalents seem to 
experience greater difficulties with. As such, the conflicting nature of the immigration 
‘issue’, and parties’ uncertainty as to how to address it, may also have contributed to 
the higher likelihood of volatility in the Dutch case.  
This suggests that party system analyses should not limit themselves to 
explaining whether immigration/integration give rise to a ‘new’ cleavage (or not), it 
also needs to account for the stability and cohesiveness of these divides and for 
parties’ ability to set the agenda by framing ‘new’ questions in a way that is to their 
advantage. Multi-dimensionality, and the strains that exist within, point to how the 
immigration ‘issue’ is likely to undergo a continuous number of (re)framings, such 
that electoral strategies are often constrained by, but also adapted to, the prevailing 
consensus of what the issue at stake is.  
Finally, by using a new method for measuring manifesto stances, we have 
been able to capture nuances in the expressed statements. This enabled us to a carry 
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out a closer examination of how the political mainstream has contested an 
increasingly contentious issue and to explain when, and why, they decide to make any 
drastic positional changes. Such an approach opens up further comparative 
opportunities to investigate the relationship between cleavage stability, issue 
competition, and positional changes.   
 
Word count: 7191 (18/02/2014) 
 
                                                 
1
 The 2010 version, however, contains questions relating to both immigration and integration (Bakker 
et al, 2012).  
2
 Manifestos were gathered from http://www.rug.nl/dnpp/index; http://snd.gu.se/en/vivill and from 
individual party websites. The 2003 election (NL) is omitted since CDA and PvdA ran the same 
manifestos as in 2002. The four centre-right parties in Sweden issued a single coalition manifesto in 
2006 and 2010 but also published individual manifestos or party programs. The former are used for FP; 
CP and KD (2006-10), whereas the latter were used for M (2006-10).  
3
 ‘Mainstream party’ is defined as one likely to be a ‘dominant force[s] in the formation of 
government’ (Ackland and Gibson, 2013:235), or act as a ‘junior’ partner in this process (either in a 
formal coalition or as an informal supporter in parliament). They also need to correspond Caramani’s 
(2004) categories (1-10) and not be classified as radical/extremist/far-left/right in the literature (Mudde, 
2007). This gave six (NL) and sevenr (SWE) parties: CDA (Christen-Democratisch Appèl), VVD 
(Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie); D’66 (Politieke Partij Democraten 66), PvdA (Partij van 
de Arbeid); SP (Socialistische Partij), and GL (Groen-Links); M (Moderaterna); FP (Folkpartiet); KD 
(Kristdemokraterna); CP (Centerpartiet); SAP (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti); MP 
(Miljöpartiet) and V (Vänsterpartiet).  
4
 1) Immigration (in general) + 2) Labour Migration + 3) Asylum Seekers and Refugees + 4) Family 
Reunification + 5) Unaccompanied Minors + 6) Student Migration + 7) Integration.  
5
 ‘Immigration’; ‘Labour’; ‘Asylum’; ‘Refugee; ‘Family; ‘Unaccompanied’; ‘Minor’; ‘Student’; 
‘Illegal’; ‘Undocumented’; ‘Clandestine’ and ‘Integration’.   
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6
 ‘Immigration (in general) and ‘Student Migration’ were scored: (-1) if the statement considered the 
category to have a predominantly positive effect on society and (+1) if negative. 
7
 This particular scoring system may appear counter-intuitive but is adopted so as to be consistent with 
De Lange’s measurement scheme.  
8
 E.g. references made to the effects on labour market and employment agreements, the ‘knowledge 
economy’ and/or [country’s] position in the global economy.  
9
 E.g. references made to ‘rights’ (to family life and of children), and/or to state-individual relations 
(e.g. access to education; issues of detention or deportation).  
10
 Included references to e.g. allow applicants to work and/or eligibility to welfare benefits; (global) 
human rights/nationalist concerns; ‘real’/‘bogus’ claims; role of national/supra-national levels in the 
decision-making process; labour market access; discrimination legislation; support for ethnic 
entrepreneurs, conflicting values; multiculturalism/assimilation and language acquisition. 
11
 If the manifesto discussed the category in relation to its economic/socio-cultural implications a score 
of (1) was given, regardless of the number of times mentioned. If not mentioned, a score of (0) was 
given. The total category score was then divided by number of parties, and each individual category 
were added together to provide the total score for that year.   
12
 The following formula was used: average change (No PRR in parliament): [total number of 
changes/parties x nr. of election cycles]; average change (PRR in parliament): [total number of 
changes/parties x nr. of election cycles].  
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TABLE 1. Manifesto positions on the immigration ‘issue’ - The Netherlands 
 
 
1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 
SP 1 -2 -2 0 1 
GL -3 -5 -4 -7 -5 
PvdA -1 -4 0 0 -1 
D’66 -3 -3 1 -2 -2 
VVD 1 0 4 -2 3 
CDA 0 -2 3 0 2 
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TABLE 2. Manifesto positions on the immigration ‘issue’ – Sweden 
 
 
1991 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 
MP 0 0 -1 -2 -1 -3 
V -1 0 -3 -2 0 -1 
SAP -1 0 0 -3 -2 -2 
CP -2 -1 -1 -1 -2 -3 
FP -1 -2 -1 -4 -2 -3 
KD -1 -1 0 -1 -1 -5 
M -1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -3 
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TABLE 3. Type and Direction of Changes – The Netherlands 
 
 
1994-1998 1998-2002 2002-2006 2006-2010 
SP Dr Ch (LM) No Ch Dr Ch (RA) Ch (RA) 
GL Dr Ch (LM) Ch (RA)  Dr Ch (LM) Dr Ch (RA) 
PvdA Dr Ch (LM) Dr Ch (RA) No Ch Ch (LM) 
D’66 No Ch Dr Ch (RA) Dr Ch (LM) No Ch 
VVD Ch (LM) Dr Ch (RA) Dr Ch (LM) Dr Ch (RA) 
CDA Dr Ch (LM) Dr Ch (RA) Dr Ch (LM) Dr Ch (RA) 
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TABLE 4. Type and Direction of Changes – Sweden  
 
 
1991-1994 1994-1998 1998-2002 2002-2006 2006-2010 
MP No Ch Ch (LM) Ch (LM) Ch (RA)  Dr Ch (LM) 
V Ch (RA)  Dr Ch (LM) Ch (RA)  Dr Ch (RA) Ch (LM) 
SAP Ch (RA)  No Ch Dr Ch (LM) Ch (RA) No Ch 
CP Ch (RA)  No Ch No Ch Ch (LM) Ch (LM) 
FP Ch (LM) Ch (RA)  Dr Ch (LM) Dr Ch (RA) Ch (LM) 
KD No Ch Ch (RA)  Ch (LM) No Ch Dr Ch (LM) 
M No Ch No Ch No Ch Ch (LM) Ch (LM) 
 
Type  
No Ch = No Change 
Ch = Change (1 spatial location movement) 
Dr Ch = Drastic Change (2 or more spatial location movements) 
 
Direction 
RA=Restrictive/Assimilationist 
LM= Liberal/Multicultural   
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TABLE 5. Change with/without PRR in national parliament – the Netherlands  
 
 
No PRR No PRR PRR PRR 
 
1994-
1998 
1998-
2002 
2002-
2006 
2006-
2010 
SP -3 0 2 1 
GL -2 1 -3 2 
PvdA -3 4 0 -1 
D’66 0 4 -3 0 
VVD -1 4 -6 5 
CDA -2 5 -3 2 
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TABLE 6. Change with/without PRR in national parliament – Sweden 
 
 
PRR No PRR No PRR No PRR No PRR 
 
1991-
1994 
1994-
1998 
1998-
2002 
2002-
2006 
2006-
2010 
MP 0 -1 -1 1 -2 
V  1 -3 1 2 -1 
SAP 1 0 -3 1 0 
CP 1 0 0 -1 -1 
FP -1 1 -3 2 -1 
KD 0 1 -1 0 -4 
M  0 0 0 -1 -1 
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Figure 1. Impact Index 
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